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INTRODUCTION
As social media use has proliferated,1 social media algorithms
have become integral to our lives.2 Social media companies design
algorithms to increase user engagement, which increases advertisement exposure and, therefore, profit.3
How do social media algorithms increase engagement? Algorithms try to fill each user’s feed with content of interest to the
user.4 To put “interesting and relatable” content on a user’s page,
the algorithm analyzes data generated by the user’s interactions
online.5 The algorithm interprets these interactions as indicators of
interest, and as such, it analyzes things such as what content the
user likes or shares, time spent with a given page or profile onscreen, profiles and pages searched, whom the user directs messages, and whom the user knows in real life,6 as well as location
data and the user’s friends’ interests.7 Based on this information,
the algorithm creates a pool of content that it predicts might interest the user.8 Then, the algorithm uses certain factors to rank
how appealing each piece of content will be to the user.9 Finally, the
algorithm pushes the content that it predicts will most interest the
1. In 2005, just 5 percent of American adults used social media. As of February 2021, 72
percent of American adults use social media. Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr.
7, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/social-media/ [https://perma.cc/
6BCH-LRDL].
2. All the major social media companies use algorithms. See Joanna Stern, Social-Media
Algorithms Rule How We See the World. Good Luck Trying to Stop Them., WALL ST. J. (Jan.
17, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/social-media-algorithms-rule-how-we-seethe-world-good-luck-trying-to-stop-them-11610884800?mod=rss_Technology [https://perma.cc/
KP2T-ECVL].
3. See Sang Ah Kim, Technology Explainer, Social Media Algorithms: Why You See What
You See, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 147, 147-48 (2017).
4. See id. at 148.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 149-50.
7. See Joe Tidy, Why Phones That Secretly Listen to Us Are a Myth, BBC NEWS (Sept. 5,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-49585682 [https://perma.cc/G8KU-P67H].
8. See Kim, supra note 3, at 150.
9. See id. The algorithm considers factors such as interactions by close friends and the
type of content involved to create these rankings. See id. at 150-51. However, the exact ranking system and way in which an algorithm curates a user’s feed varies by social media company. See id. at 151.
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user to the top of the user’s feed.10 Putting such content at the top
of a user’s feed “is expected to increase the chance a user will engage
with the [content].”11
By predicting the kinds of content a user might like and placing
only those kinds of content into a user’s feed, social media algorithms create “filter bubbles.”12 A social media algorithm creates a
filter bubble when it places only the same or similar kinds of
information and content into a user’s feed, creating an echo
chamber.13 These echo chambers are not innocuous.14 Filter bubbles
skew the information that a user receives such that the user learns
only one side of a given story.15 These bubbles persist across social
media platforms both because algorithms share user information
across platforms16 and because some companies own multiple
platforms.17 Given the echo chambers these bubbles create and the
persistence of information bubbles across platforms, algorithms
contribute to modern political polarization.18 Furthermore, algorithms actively encourage this polarization.19

10. See id. at 150.
11. Id.
12. Emilie Robichaud, How Social Media Algorithms Drive Political Polarization, MEDIUM
(Oct. 8, 2020), https://medium.com/swlh/how-persuasive-algorithms-drive-political-polariza
tion-75819854c11d [https://perma.cc/54S5-QT33]; Rabbit Hole, One: Wonderland, N.Y. TIMES
at 21:13-14 (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/podcasts/rabbit-hole-inter
net-youtube-virus.html? [https://perma.cc/AGX5-6PHV].
13. See NPR Staff, The Reason Your Feed Became an Echo Chamber—And What to Do
About It, NPR (July 24, 2016, 7:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/
2016/07/24/486941582/the-reason-your-feed-became-an-echo-chamber-and-what-to-do-about-it
[https:// perma.cc/3VXD-RHSF]; Rabbit Hole, supra note 12, at 21:13-22:14.
14. See Rabbit Hole, supra note 12, at 22:13-20 (describing how during a certain protest,
YouTube users received only one side of the story in their feeds and which side of the story
the user heard depended on the algorithm’s assessment of the user’s past interactions and
interests).
15. See id.
16. See Facebook’s Data-Sharing Deals Exposed, BBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.
bbc.com/news/technology-46618582 [https://perma.cc/SZK2-AAMK].
17. See Sam Shead, Facebook Owns the Four Most Downloaded Apps of the Decade, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50838013 [https://perma.cc/
Z8KL-E5EX] (stating that Facebook, now known as Meta, owns Instagram); Associated Press,
Google Buys YouTube for $1.65 Billion, NBC NEWS (Oct. 9, 2006, 3:54 PM), https://www.nbc
news.com/id/wbna15196982 [https://perma.cc/AJ3U-RFUD].
18. See Robichaud, supra note 12.
19. See id.
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Moreover, social media companies design algorithms to do more
than simply provide information: they intentionally design these
algorithms to persuade.20 To turn a profit for themselves and those
advertising on their sites, social media companies design algorithms
with “the underlying motive of modifying a certain attitude or
behavior, exploiting psychological and sociological theories, such as
persuasion and social influence.”21 As such, social media algorithms
can have real-world impacts on people’s beliefs and actions.22 This
is where the problem arises.
As algorithms designed to modify beliefs and behavior funnel
people into filter bubbles, social media sites become breeding
grounds for violence.23 Within these information bubbles, users
begin to inaccurately believe that other people support violence.24
Furthermore, being inundated with a specific idea across platforms
leads users to believe that the idea is true or give the idea more
credence.25 As such, when users repeatedly see content with violent
messages, users begin to believe that many others support these
violent, extreme ideas even though this belief is not aligned with reality.26 When users believe that violent ideas are supported truths,
users become more likely to engage in violence themselves.27
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. See James Temple, Evidence Is Piling Up That Facebook Can Incite Violence, MIT
TECH. REV. (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/08/21/2339/evidence-is%20piling-up-that-facebook-can-incite-racial-violence/ [https://perma.cc/S7KP-M878] (detailing a study showing that higher Facebook use corresponded to more attacks on refugees);
Khandis R. Blake, Siobhan M. O’Dean, James Lian & Thomas F. Denson, Misogynistic Tweets
Correlate with Violence Against Women, 32 PSYCH. SCI. 315, 323 (2021) (showing that more
misogynistic tweets in a geographic area corresponded with increased rates of violence against
women in that area); Rohingya Sue Facebook for $150bn over Myanmar Hate Speech, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 7, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59558090 [https://perma.cc/AK2KQUXW] (describing a suit alleging that Facebook’s algorithm “amplified hate speech against
the Rohingya people,” thereby increasing violence against that group).
24. See Temple, supra note 23.
25. See Emily Dreyfuss, Want to Make a Lie Seem True? Say It Again. And Again. And
Again, WIRED (Feb. 11, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/dont-believe-lies-justpeople-repeat/ [https://perma.cc/3SLV-CGQD] (describing the “illusory truth effect” where
people “equate[ ] repetition with truth”); Aumyo Hassan & Sarah J. Barber, The Effects of
Repetition Frequency on the Illusory Truth Effect, 6 COGNITIVE RSCH.: PRINCIPLES &
IMPLICATIONS 38, 38 (2021).
26. See Hassan & Barber, supra note 25; Temple, supra note 23.
27. See Rabbit Hole, supra note 12; Temple, supra note 23.
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Therefore, calls for violence and circulation of information about violent ideas on social media platforms present real risks and correlate
to real-world violent outcomes.28 Moreover, recent whistleblower
testimony demonstrates that social media companies are aware that
their algorithms amplify “dangerous speech that has led to violence
and death,” but companies have ignored or buried these findings,
prioritizing engagement and profit over the very real risk of
violence.29
This is an incitement problem. Speech causes tangible harm when
it incites violence.30 Inciting speech falls outside the First Amendment’s protection and can, therefore, be punished civilly and/or
criminally.31 Currently, courts use the Brandenburg standard to
determine whether speech qualifies as unprotected incitement.32 To
qualify as incitement, the Brandenburg standard requires that
speech is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action.”33 Three basic elements
comprise this standard: (1) intent, (2) imminence, and (3) likelihood.34
Scholars have argued that algorithm-based decisions, like the
ones that social media algorithms make about what content to put
into people’s feeds, qualify as speech.35 Social media algorithms’
28. See Temple, supra note 23 (describing three thousand instances of violence observed
over a two-year period, finding that violence was much more likely in areas with increased
Facebook use, which held true regardless of city size, political leanings, or economic status,
and linking speech on Facebook to violence in Myanmar); Sheera Frenkel, The Storming of
Capitol Hill Was Organized on Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.
com/2021/01/06/us/politics/protesters-storm-capitol-hill-building.html [https://perma.cc/H2ADV6VQ] (discussing how the groups that stormed the Capitol first found one another and began
to plan together on mainstream social media sites, such as Twitter and Facebook).
29. See Rob Reich, Mehran Sahami & Jeremy M. Weinstein, Opinion, Facebook Isn’t the
Only Problem, CNN BUS. (Oct. 14, 2021, 9:06 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/14/
perspectives/facebook-frances-haugen-big-tech-regulation/index.html [https://perma.cc/KC6LLVH8]; see also Facebook Admits It Was Used to ‘Incite Offline Violence’ in Myanmar, BBC
NEWS (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46105934 [https://perma.cc/42TSFQAY] (describing that since at least 2018, Facebook has been aware that its platform and
algorithm have enabled violence against the Rohingya people).
30. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. See Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection for Search
Engine Search Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 883, 884-85 (2012); Stuart Minor Benjamin,
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decisions have a message of their own, beyond the message of any
individual piece of content: the message of the filter bubble itself.36
While a post might say “I hate lawyers,” a social media algorithm
that sends this post to a user will send countless similar pieces of
content, culminating in a message from the algorithm itself that
“lawyers are bad.” As such, these scholars argue that the First
Amendment applies or should apply to these algorithmic decisions.37
Assuming that these scholars are correct and that social media
algorithms’ decisions qualify as speech to which the First Amendment applies (social media-algorithmic speech),38 this Note proposes
a legal solution to the increasing problem of violence stemming from
social media. This Note asserts that the incitement standard for
social media-algorithmic speech should be less stringent because the
Brandenburg standard does not apply well to new media, social
media-algorithmic speech is much more likely than other speech to
actually produce lawless action, and the traditional First Amendment justifications do not apply to social media algorithms’ speech.
Therefore, the Supreme Court should tweak the incitement standard for social media-algorithmic speech by altering Brandenburg’s
intent and imminence requirements.
Part I of this Note provides relevant history and background
about the rationales behind and values of free speech and the
current incitement standard. Part II presents the problem at hand,
which is that social media-algorithmic speech is uniquely likely to
produce lawless action while the Brandenburg standard does not
and cannot address this problem sufficiently. Part III discusses a
solution to this problem, arguing that the Court should modify the
Brandenburg standard as applied to social media-algorithmic
speech by altering the intent requirement and relaxing or removing
the imminence requirement. Part III also addresses potential
counterarguments.

Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1446-47 (2013).
36. See Benjamin, supra note 35, at 1446-47.
37. See Volokh & Falk, supra note 35, at 887-91; Benjamin, supra note 35, at 1446-47.
38. See Volokh & Falk, supra note 35, at 887-91; Benjamin, supra note 35, at 1446-47.
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I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
This conversation should start at the very beginning. Why is
there a right to free speech enshrined in the First Amendment?
What is the current standard for incitement and why? How are
justifications for free speech and the Brandenburg standard
interrelated? This Part discusses these preliminary questions to lay
the groundwork for later discussion about how free speech justifications and the Brandenburg standard interact with and fail to
address the problems of social media-algorithmic incitement and
solutions to this issue.
A. Free Speech Justifications and Values
Free speech is somewhat unique in Supreme Court constitutional
jurisprudence because in dealing with free speech, the Court generally does not look to history or the Framers’ intent for interpretive
guidance.39 The Court does not look to history in part because it did
not begin building a body of free speech jurisprudence until the
early twentieth century.40 Furthermore, the Court tends not to look
to history or the Framers’ intent because free speech history is
sparse and conflicting and the Framers’ intent is unclear.41
Initially, the free speech right appeared to be a response to
England’s licensing and seditious libel laws.42 England required that
people submit publications to royal officials for licensing before
printing.43 These licensing laws were a form of prior restraint on
speech.44 England also prosecuted seditious libel, which is inten-

39. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1179 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds.,
6th ed. 2020).
40. See generally Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (one of the first instances
in which the Court took up a case about First Amendment freedom of speech).
41. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 1178-79.
42. See id.
43. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 2 (Robert C.
Clark et al. eds., 6th ed. 2016).
44. See id.
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tional criticism of the government, government officials, or laws.45
Against this backdrop, one might assume that the Framers enshrined the free speech right to eliminate prior restraints and
seditious libel laws.46 However, certain Framers passed the Alien
and Sedition Acts of 1798, which prohibited seditious libel in the
United States much like England’s laws did, muddying the waters
of the Framers’ intent in establishing freedom of speech.47 Aside
from this conflicted history, there is “little indication of what the
[F]ramers intended.”48
Thus, the Court has instead turned to philosophical justifications
for free speech as a fundamental right.49 These justifications fall
into a few categories: the search for truth, self-government,
autonomy, and negative justifications,50 as well as tolerance.51
As for the search for truth, the argument is that suppressing
ideas is wrong because people can only discover truth by subjecting
all ideas to the “marketplace of ideas.”52 Even false ideas are
necessary to the search for truth because only false ideas adequately
test truth, and truth will always survive the marketplace of ideas.53
Furthermore, the best way to alleviate false or dangerous speech
and ideas is to subject them to good, truthful counterspeech.54
The self-government justification is that free speech is crucial to
democratic self-governance, providing essential functions to the
democratic process.55 The ability to speak freely ensures that cit-

45. See id.
46. See id. at 2-3; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 1178-79.
47. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 1178.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 1179-84; SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43, at 5.
50. See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43, at 5-10; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375-78 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring).
51. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 1184.
52. See id. at 1181-82; SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43, at 5-6; Whitney, 274 U.S. at
375-78 (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring).
53. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 1181-82; Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market.”).
54. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 1181-82; SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43,
at 5-6; Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-78 (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring).
55. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 1180-81; SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43,
at 6-8; Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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izens are informed and active in discussions of policy and politics.56
Therefore, protecting speech from censorship informs citizens and
enhances policy making, the quality of the government, and the
quality of policies.57 Furthermore, by promoting discussion of a variety of ideas, free speech helps to prevent incumbent governments
from entrenching themselves indefinitely.58 Additionally, free speech
helps to prevent tyranny and abuses of power.59 Free speech allows
citizens to expose abuses and potentially tyrannical acts and critique them, thereby mitigating these evils.60 Finally, free speech
promotes democratic self-governance “by providing a safety valve for
dissent,” which helps to promote political safety.61
Autonomy justifies free speech because free speech is essential to
individual development, which is the ultimate goal of the state.62
When people can speak freely, they grow by expressing and defining
themselves.63 Furthermore, censorship is inconsistent with the idea
of autonomous people.64
The negative justification for freedom of speech is based on the
idea that there are “special reasons to distrust government in the
realm of speech regulation.”65 Even if speech is not especially worthy
of protection, the Constitution must nonetheless protect it because
the government is ill-suited to regulate speech.66 For example, if the
government regulated speech, it would be incentivized to censor
dissenting views, minority views, and criticism (all of which are
essential to self-governance).67 Moreover, the government struggles

56. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 1180-81; SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43,
at 6-8; Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring).
57. SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43, at 7.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 7-8.
60. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 1180-81; SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43,
at 7-8.
61. SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43, at 8; see also Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis
& Holmes, JJ., concurring).
62. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 1183; SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43, at
8-9; Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring).
63. See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43, at 9.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See id.; Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 367 (2003) (plurality opinion).
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to make correct distinctions and accurately distinguish truth from
falsehood.68
The final justification for free speech is tolerance.69 The basic
argument is that free speech exposes people to new and different
ideas, which is integral to tolerance, which, in turn, is—or should
be—a crucial value in society.70 Free speech exists to shape society’s
intellectual character by developing people’s capacity to control
intolerant responses to various social stimuli.71
Because history and the Framers’ intent are sparse and contradictory,72 the Court has turned to these philosophical justifications for
the free speech right.73 The Court has used these justifications to
undergird its rationales in its free speech jurisprudence.74 Thus,
these justifications are relevant—even essential—to understanding
the Brandenburg standard for incitement75 as well as this Note’s
critiques of the Brandenburg standard.
B. Brandenburg Standard for Incitement
For decades, the Court used a less speech-protective standard—the “clear and present danger” test—for incitement.76 In
1969, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court announced a new standard
68. See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43, at 10.
69. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 1184.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 1178-79; SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43, at 3.
73. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365-67 (2003) (plurality opinion) (discussing
the need to allow discussions of even hateful ideas in a tolerant society); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (espousing the truth, selfgovernment, and autonomy justifications for free speech); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964) (discussing the self-government justification for free speech).
74. See, e.g., Black, 538 U.S. at 365-67; Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-77; Sullivan, 376 U.S.
at 270.
75. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969) (per curiam).
76. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (announcing the “clear and
present danger” test, under which speech qualified as incitement if it was “used in such
circumstances and [was] of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that [it
would] bring about the substantive evils that [the government] has a right to prevent”). The
“clear and present danger” test was applied such that it was not particularly protective of free
speech. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 654-55, 671-72 (1925) (applying the “clear
and present danger” test to uphold a criminal anarchy statute and a conviction under that
statute); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 359-60, 371-72 (applying the “clear and present danger” test to
uphold a criminal syndicalism statute and a conviction under that statute).
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for assessing whether speech qualifies as unprotected incitement.77
The Brandenburg standard is more protective of speech than the
“clear and present danger” test.78 The Court shifted its incitement
standard after acknowledging that the old test, under which mere
teaching or advocacy of the necessity of violent action could be
punished, did not adequately protect free speech.79 Instead, that test
risked censorship that could harm self-government, autonomy, and
the search for truth.80 In contrast, the Brandenburg standard
declares that speech must be “directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and [be] likely to incite or produce such
action” for it to qualify as unprotected incitement.81 As such, the
Brandenburg standard breaks down into three essential elements:
(1) intent, (2) imminence, and (3) likelihood.82
The first element of the Brandenburg standard is intent.83 This
element requires that speech be “directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action.”84 The Court fleshed out this requirement
in later cases, demonstrating that a reckless intent might not be
adequate to satisfy the Brandenburg standard.85 Speech that is
simply reckless with respect to possible future consequences is
generally not sufficient to meet the Brandenburg standard and
qualify as unprotected incitement.86
The second element of the Brandenburg standard is imminence.87
This element requires that the speech be intended to incite or
produce “imminent lawless action.”88 Imminence seems to require
77. See 395 U.S. at 447.
78. Compare id. at 444-45, 447-49 (using the new standard to invalidate Ohio’s criminal
syndicalism law and a conviction based on that law), with Whitney, 274 U.S. at 359-60, 371-72
(applying the “clear and present danger” test to uphold a criminal syndicalism law and a
conviction based on that law).
79. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 505-11 (1951) (plurality opinion);
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-49; NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 926-29
(1982).
80. See, e.g., Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-49; Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 926-29.
81. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam).
86. See id.
87. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
88. Id.
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a fairly immediate response.89 In Brandenburg, a contingent statement that if something continued, “there might have to be some
revengeance [sic] taken” did not qualify as imminent.90 Further
considerations that might also have prevented the speech in
Brandenburg from being imminent were that it was about possible
violence at a future time and that it was spoken far from the
proposed location of potential future violence.91 Similarly, in Hess,
the speech was not imminent because it counseled future action.92
The dissent highlighted that the speech at issue might even have
been counseling future action that would occur soon—within mere
hours.93 As such, the imminence element seems to require that
speech be directed toward producing lawless action very immediately.
The third element of the Brandenburg standard is likelihood.94
This element requires that the speech be “likely to incite or produce”
imminent lawless action.95 In Hess, to evaluate likelihood, the Court
considered to whom speech was directed, the volume of speech, and
the direction the speaker faced.96 Because the speech was not
directed to any specific person or group and did not exhort the crowd
to take lawless action, the speech failed to meet the likelihood
requirement.97 Furthermore, the Court has held that speech does
not satisfy the likelihood element if lawless activity does not actually follow speech and do so quickly.98
Ultimately, because the Brandenburg standard is so exacting in
practice, it is very speech-protective in service of free speech’s
theoretical justifications.99 However, this Note will elucidate that
89. See, e.g., id. at 446-49; Hess, 414 U.S. at 108-09.
90. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446-49.
91. See id. at 444-47.
92. See 414 U.S. at 108-09.
93. See id. at 111 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
94. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
95. Id.
96. See 414 U.S. at 107.
97. See id. at 107-09.
98. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (stating that the
speech in question was not likely to produce imminent lawless action because it was not
followed by acts of violence and the acts of violence identified occurred weeks or months after
the speech occurred).
99. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444-49; Hess, 414 U.S. at 107-09 (1973) (per curiam);
Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 928.
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this protectiveness does not serve society well or advance free
speech ideals and justifications properly in the arena of social
media-algorithmic speech. This problem with the Brandenburg
standard arises due to the uniqueness of social media-algorithmic
speech, which this Note describes in detail in Part II.
II. THE PROBLEM
This Note argues that social media algorithms’ decisions are
uniquely likely to produce lawless action and that the Brandenburg
standard does not apply well to social media-algorithmic speech.
This Part will describe how this type of speech is especially likely to
produce lawlessness and why the Brandenburg standard is ill-suited
to the kind of speech and risks at issue here.
A. Social Media-Algorithmic Speech Is Uniquely Likely to Produce
Lawless Action
Research has found that social media use uniquely correlates
with violence.100 This research shows that more hours spent using
social media “correlates directly with aggressive behavior.”101
Furthermore, people who see violent content online are not only
more likely to be violent but also to commit serious crimes and have
increased potential to engage in copycat behavior.102 Given the realworld violence that directly correlates with increased social media
use,103 people should be concerned about the content they view. This
unique correlation between increased social media use and user
violence104 demonstrates a connection between social media algorithms’ decisions and violence because what distinguishes social

100. See The Digital Age, Social Media: Is There a Correlation Between Its Use and Violent
Behavior?, THE DIGIT. AGE AT THE U. OF NEW S. WALES (Dec. 4, 2018), https://web.archive.org/
web/20210309235142/https://blogs.unsw.edu.au/thedigitalage/blog/2018/12/social-media-isthere-a-correlation-between-its-use-and-violent-behavior/ [https://perma.cc/Z5FF-HCND].
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., id.
104. See id.; Temple, supra note 23; Blake et al., supra note 23, at 323.
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media use from regular speech is the algorithm itself, which is designed to influence and alter people’s beliefs and ideas.105
The connection between increased social media use and violence
is particularly disconcerting because people use social media so
much. In 2020, Americans spent an average of 1,300 hours on social media.106 Americans spend nearly an hour on Facebook and
nearly an hour on Instagram each day on average.107
Moreover, not only is increased social media use connected with
violence but some studies have also suggested that the more time a
user spends on a social media site, the more extreme the content the
algorithm sends the user.108 TikTok users watch videos for an average of twenty seconds and therefore can consume four hundred
videos in approximately two hours.109 If a user interacts with transphobic content, over the course of four hundred videos, the TikTok
algorithm will begin sending the user increasingly extreme, farright content, including thinly veiled threats and open calls for violence.110 People use social media overwhelmingly, and this increased
use not only correlates with increased violence but also sends more
violent content to users, which is likely to inspire violence.
Furthermore, social media-algorithmic speech inspires violence
in a way that is inescapable. Social media-algorithmic speech has a
message of its own—the message of the echo chamber itself—rather
than just each individual piece of content’s message.111 For example,
a piece of content, such as a tweet, might say, “I hate lawyers.” An
algorithm that decides to send this piece of content to a user will
105. See Robichaud, supra note 12.
106. Peter Suciu, Americans Spent on Average More Than 1,300 Hours on Social Media
Last Year, FORBES (June 24, 2021, 3:47 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2021/06/
24/americans-spent-more-than-1300-hours-on-social-media/?sh=1b7d472547 [https://perma.cc/
A68E-WXPY]; see also Brooke Auxier & Monica Anderson, Social Media Use in 2021, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/04/07/ social-media-usein-2021/ [https://perma.cc/HM9L-XW98] (showing that a majority of Facebook, Snapchat, and
Instagram users visit these sites daily).
107. Suciu, supra note 106.
108. See, e.g., Olivia Little & Abbie Richards, TikTok’s Algorithm Leads Users from
Transphobic Videos to Far-Right Rabbit Holes, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Oct. 5, 2021, 9:03
AM), https://www.mediamatters.org/tiktok/tiktoks-algorithm-leads-users-transphobic-videosfar-right-rabbit-holes [https://perma.cc/KRK7-WV6E].
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See Benjamin, supra note 35, at 1446.
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send countless similar pieces of content from different sources, all
culminating in a message from the algorithm itself that “lawyers
are inherently bad, and we should eliminate this problem with violence.” In the context of “normal” spoken or written speech, people
can avoid speech by stepping away—“simply by averting their eyes”
or covering their ears.112
However, online, people cannot simply step away from social
media algorithms’ speech. Social media use is incredibly pervasive.113 Social media algorithms are just as pervasive.114 Moreover,
social media is addictive, prompting people to use it more and more
for increased levels of dopamine.115 Thus, the vast majority of
American adults are exposed to social media-algorithmic speech on
a daily basis.116 These algorithms create filter bubbles that bombard
users with only content containing the same or similar messages,
creating powerful echo chambers.117 Just blocking, muting, or
reporting certain users or pieces of content is not enough to combat
these filter bubbles because when creating filter bubbles, algorithms draw from a vast array of sources, many of which users
cannot control.118
Furthermore, these filter bubbles do not exist solitarily. Generally, a user will not have one filter bubble on Twitter where the algorithm says “lawyers are bad” while having a different filter bubble
on Facebook where the algorithm says “lawyers are good.” Instead,
because some companies own multiple social media platforms119 and
112. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
113. See Social Media Fact Sheet, supra note 1 (demonstrating that currently, 72 percent
of American adults use social media).
114. See Stern, supra note 2 (showing that all major social media companies use algorithms
to order content).
115. See Bruce Goldman, Addictive Potential of Social Media Explained, STAN. MED.
(Oct. 29, 2021), https://scopeblog.stanford.edu/2021/10/29/addictive-potential-of-social-mediaexplained/ [https://perma.cc/FJ7D-F4HU].
116. See Social Media Fact Sheet, supra note 1 (showing that of the 72 percent of American
adults who use social media, the majority of these adults use social media daily); Stern, supra
note 2.
117. See NPR Staff, supra note 13.
118. See Tidy, supra note 7 (explaining that algorithms decide what to put in a user’s feed
based on a wide range of sources, many of which users cannot easily evade or change, such
as time spent on a page or profile, whom the user knows in real life, the user’s location data,
and the user’s friends’ interests).
119. See Shead, supra note 17 (saying that Facebook/Meta owns Instagram); Associated
Press, supra note 17 (saying that Google owns YouTube).
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share information,120 and because different platforms’ algorithms
use similar information to decide what content to push,121 the same
filter bubble persists across platforms. Thus, people cannot “simply
... avert[ ] their eyes”122 and thereby avoid social media-algorithmic
speech. Instead, this speech bombards people with the same
messaging across platforms inescapably.
Not only is social media-algorithmic speech especially pervasive123
and correlated with violent outcomes,124 the way algorithms are
designed means that this kind of speech inevitably causes and
correlates with violence. Through their speech, social media algorithms polarize people.125 By creating filter bubbles that act as echo
chambers, social media algorithms increase polarization.126
Moreover, social media companies intend for their algorithms to
encourage polarization.127 To increase engagement and, therefore,
profits, social media algorithms intentionally push inflammatory
content.128 As algorithmic decisions funnel people into polarizing
filter bubbles, natural psychological processes cause people to believe the increasingly radicalized information that they receive.129
120. See Facebook’s Data-Sharing Deals Exposed, supra note 16.
121. See Kim, supra note 3, at 149-51 (stating that social media algorithms decide what
content to push to users based on things such as time spent with a given page or profile on
the screen, profiles and pages searched, whom the user direct messages, whom the user knows
in real life, likes, shares, and type of content involved); Tidy, supra note 7 (explaining that
social media algorithms also consider location data and friends’ interests).
122. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
123. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
125. See Robichaud, supra note 12; Rabbit Hole, supra note 12, at 24:00-13.
126. See Robichaud, supra note 12; Rabbit Hole, supra note 12, at 20:49-21:00, 21:43-24:13.
127. See Robichaud, supra note 12; Katherine J. Wu, Radical Ideas Spread Through Social
Media. Are the Algorithms to Blame?, PBS (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/
article/radical-ideas-social-media-algorithms/ [https://perma.cc/T5GK-3NYM].
128. See Ryan Mac & Sheera Frenkel, Internal Alarm, Public Shrugs: Facebook’s Employees
Dissect Its Election Role, N.Y.TIMES (Oct. 25, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/22/tech
nology/facebook-election-misinformation.html [https://perma.cc/35V9-9WUB]; Adam Satariano & Mike Isaac, Facebook Whistle-Blower Brings Campaign to Europe After Disclosures,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/25/business/frances-haugen-face
book.html [https://perma.cc/DM2N-DJ5L]. Similarly, most social media users report seeing
content that makes them angry. See Aaron Smith, Algorithms in Action: The Content People
See on Social Media, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/
2018/11/16/algorithms-in-action-the-content-people-see-on-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/9L
QJ-B6H2].
129. See Wu, supra note 127 (describing how social media algorithms push increasingly
polarized and polarizing information, shaping beliefs); Dreyfuss, supra note 25 (describing the
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The more that people see an idea repeated—which happens with
increasing frequency in the echo chambers that social media algorithms’ decisions create130—the more likely they are to believe that
idea, regardless of whether the idea is true or supportable.131 Thus,
within filter bubbles, under social media algorithms’ direction,
people come to believe that violence is more widely supported than
it is.132 These influences are especially pernicious precisely because
social media algorithms are designed to sway users’ beliefs,
attitudes, and, ultimately, behavior.133 In this setting, it is unsurprising that exposure to social media algorithms correlates with
violent outcomes—they are designed to create polarization that
pushes people towards violence.
Social media algorithms are primed to be associated with realworld violence given their pervasiveness,134 influential nature,135
polarizing influence,136 and association with beliefs that violence is
supported.137 Given its relationship to violence, social media-algorithmic speech presents an incitement problem. However, as the
next Section will elucidate, the current incitement standard is illsuited to address the problems of social media-algorithmic speech.
B. Brandenburg Is Ill-Suited to Social Media-Algorithmic Speech
Despite the violent outcomes uniquely associated with social
media-algorithmic speech, because the Brandenburg standard is
so stringent, any form of internet speech is highly unlikely to qualify as unprotected incitement. Thus, even social media-algorithmic
“illusory truth effect,” which means that people “equate[ ] repetition with truth”); Hassan &
Barber, supra note 25.
130. See supra notes 108-28 and accompanying text.
131. See Dreyfuss, supra note 25.
132. See Temple, supra note 23; Jillian Petersen & James Densley, Opinion, How Social
Media Sends Extremism into Overdrive, CNN (Aug. 23, 2017, 1:24 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2017/08/23/opinions/social-media-fuels-right-wing-extremism-opinion-peterson-densley/
index.html [https://perma.cc/C345-6KS5] (stating that speech about violence on social media
“dials up the expectation that ‘everyone is doing it’”).
133. See Robichaud, supra note 12.
134. See supra notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
135. See Dreyfuss, supra note 25; Robichaud, supra note 12.
136. See Robichaud, supra note 12; Rabbit Hole, supra note 12; Wu, supra note 127; Mac
& Frenkel, supra note 128; Satariano & Isaac, supra note 128.
137. See Temple, supra note 23.
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speech that is highly likely to result in violent outcomes138 remains
within the sphere of First Amendment protection. Theoretical
justifications for free speech do not warrant this level of protection
for social media-algorithmic speech because it does not implicate the
same concerns as human speech.
1. The Brandenburg Standard Applied to Social MediaAlgorithmic Speech
To review, the Brandenburg standard requires three essential
elements for speech to qualify as unprotected incitement: (1) intent,
(2) imminence, and (3) likelihood.139 Despite the high likelihood of
violence associated with social media-algorithmic speech,140 all
social media-algorithmic speech, no matter how dangerous, would
likely fail to satisfy the intent and imminence elements of the
Brandenburg standard.
The intent element of Brandenburg requires that speech be
“directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action.”141 The
Supreme Court’s free speech jurisprudence suggests that a simply
negligent or reckless intent is likely not enough to satisfy this intent
element.142 Social media-algorithmic speech might be simply negligent or reckless about inciting lawless action because social media
companies might not have the practical certainty that lawless action
will result from this speech or the conscious object to produce
lawless action.143 Failing to meet this element alone means that

138. See supra Part II.A.
139. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
140. See supra Part II.A.
141. 395 U.S. at 447.
142. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam).
143. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)-(d) (defining the different kinds of criminal
intent). However, recent whistleblower testimony suggests that there might actually be a
strong argument that at least some social media sites meet the requirements for something
greater than merely negligent or reckless intent. See Reich et al., supra note 29 (describing
how whistleblower testimony has revealed that Facebook is aware that its algorithms amplify
“dangerous speech that has led to violence and death” but has ignored and buried these
findings, suggesting that Facebook, at least, and likely other social media companies may
have the kind of practical certainty of lawless action resulting from social media-algorithmic
speech to have a knowing intent).
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social media-algorithmic speech does not qualify as unprotected
incitement.144
To compound social media-algorithmic speech’s inability to satisfy
the Brandenburg standard, this kind of speech likely would not
meet the imminence element, which requires that speech be intended to incite or produce “imminent lawless action.”145 This
element seems to require very immediate lawless action.146 Speech
that proposes contingent lawless action or counsels future action
does not satisfy the imminence element.147 Furthermore, when a
speaker speaks at a location far from the proposed site of violence,
the speech likely does not meet the imminence element.148 Given the
very medium of the internet, social media-algorithmic speech by
default likely cannot be imminent. The nature of the internet is
such that online speech does not have the same immediacy as
speech delivered in person. When a social media algorithm decides
to place content into a user’s feed, there is no telling when the user
will receive social media-algorithmic speech. The user might not be
privy to the results of the algorithm’s decisions until hours (at least)
after they have been made, especially because social mediaalgorithmic speech is the culmination of placing many pieces of
content in the user’s feed, which is likely not imminent.149 Social
media-algorithmic speech also occurs in cyberspace, potentially far
from proposed sites of violence.150 As such, social media-algorithmic
speech would likely also fail the imminence element of the Brandenburg standard.
The Brandenburg standard is stringent in order to be highly
protective of speech.151 This standard is speech-protective to advance
the theoretical values of truth, self-government, autonomy, negative

144. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
145. See id.
146. See, e.g., id. at 446-49; Hess, 414 U.S. at 108-09.
147. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446-49; Hess, 414 U.S. at 108-09.
148. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444-47.
149. See Hess, 414 U.S. at 108-09.
150. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444-47.
151. Compare Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444-49 (using the new standard to invalidate
Ohio’s criminal syndicalism law and a conviction based on that law), with Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 359-60, 372 (1927) (applying the “clear and present danger” test to
uphold a criminal syndicalism law and a conviction based on that law).
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justifications, and tolerance that justify freedom of speech.152
However, these theoretical justifications are less relevant to social
media-algorithmic speech, and this speech requires less protection
than human speech. Therefore, social media-algorithmic speech’s
inability to meet the Brandenburg standard is even more troubling
given the high risk of violent lawless action associated with this
kind of speech.
2. First Amendment Theoretical Justifications Applied to
Social Media-Algorithmic Speech
The theoretical justifications that underpin robust First Amendment protection of speech do not apply well to social media-algorithmic speech. Under the truth justification, the First Amendment
protects speech because people can only discover truth by subjecting
all ideas to the “marketplace of ideas.”153 Even false ideas deserve
protection because they test truth in the marketplace of ideas, and
only good, truthful counterspeech can remedy falsehood.154 However,
social media algorithms do not bolster but instead radically distort
the marketplace of ideas. Social media algorithms so distort the
marketplace by creating filter bubbles that present users with echo
chambers that repeat the same idea,155 thereby making the truth
justification much less relevant to this kind of speech. In a setting
where users are essentially presented with only one idea, ideas are
no longer subjected to the counterspeech that tests truth and
counters falsehood.156 Thus, the search for truth cannot adequately
justify the robust protection that social media-algorithmic speech

152. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503, 507 (1951) (plurality opinion);
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-49; NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 926-29
(1982).
153. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 1181-82; SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43,
at 5-6; Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-78 (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring).
154. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 1181-82; SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43,
at 5-6; Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.”).
155. See Robichaud, supra note 12; Rabbit Hole, supra note 12; NPR Staff, supra note 13.
156. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 1181-82; SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43,
at 5-6; Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-78 (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring).
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currently enjoys with respect to incitement under the Brandenburg
standard.
Similarly, self-government fails to justify the high level of
protection the Brandenburg standard gives social media-algorithmic
speech. Free speech advances self-government by ensuring that citizens are informed,157 promoting discussions of policies and alternatives that stop current regimes from entrenching themselves indefinitely,158 preventing tyranny and abuses of power by providing a
medium to discuss and expose them,159 and providing an outlet for
dissent.160 But, again, social media-algorithmic speech creates filter
bubbles.161 Within these filter bubbles, algorithms do not inform
citizens because people only receive partial information—whatever
ideas comprise the echo chambers that algorithms have created for
them, social media-algorithmic speech.162 Similarly, social mediaalgorithmic speech does not help to prevent tyranny, abuse of power,
or entrenchment of current regimes because they funnel users into
filter bubbles that do not provide full and adequate information.163
The self-government-related idea of providing a safety valve for dissent applies particularly poorly to social media-algorithmic speech.
As nonhuman creatures of technology,164 social media algorithms
have no need or ability to voice dissent because they cannot vote and
are not people. Ultimately, social media-algorithmic speech does not
promote self-government and, therefore, does not merit such stringent protection under this justification.
Autonomy also fails to justify applying such a protective standard
to social media-algorithmic speech. Under the autonomy justification, the end goal of the State is autonomy, to which free speech is
essential because it empowers expression and self-definition.165
157. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 1180-81; Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis &
Holmes, JJ., concurring).
158. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 1180-81; SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43,
at 7.
159. See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43, at 7-8.
160. See id. at 8; Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring).
161. See Robichaud, supra note 12.
162. See id.; Rabbit Hole, supra note 12; NPR Staff, supra note 13.
163. See Robichaud, supra note 12; Rabbit Hole, supra note 12.
164. See Kim, supra note 3, at 149.
165. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 1183; SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43, at
8-9; Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring).
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Furthermore, censorship is inconsistent with the idea of autonomy.166 Because algorithms are not human,167 they have no need or
ability to develop the kind of autonomy that this justification
imagines. Although social media algorithms shape human selfdefinition and self-expression,168 robotic tools for ordering social
media content have no need or ability to self-define or selfexpress.169 Thus, censoring algorithms is not inconsistent with
autonomy because algorithms lack the capacity for the kind of
autonomy that this justification envisions.
Negative justifications do not adequately justify such stringent
protections of social media-algorithmic speech. The negative justifications rationale is that the government is ill-suited to regulate
speech because it would be incentivized to censor dissenting views,
minority views, and criticism170 and struggles to distinguish truth
and falsehood.171 Here, the risks of government censorship are de
minimis. Platform users’ underlying speech (in the form of posts,
shares, likes, et cetera) would remain intact if the government chose
to be less protective of social media-algorithmic speech, which is the
message sent when a social media algorithm pervasively and repeatedly pushes the same types of ideas in a filter bubble, culminating in an overarching idea that belongs to the social media algorithm itself rather than to any individual content creator. People
would still be able to voice their views, but social media algorithms,
in certain instances, would not be able to promulgate messages of
their own creation with impunity. Censoring social media algorithms this way is less concerning because these algorithms are
merely creatures of technology that cannot vote.172

166. See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43, at 9.
167. See Kim, supra note 3, at 149.
168. See Kathryn Jones, The Fallacy of Self-Expression: How Algorithms Have Invaded
Your Closet, FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.: BLOG (Oct. 5, 2018), http://www.
fordhamiplj.org/2018/10/05/the-fallacy-of-self-expression-how-algorithms-have-invaded-yourcloset/ [https://perma.cc/95W6-953E].
169. See Kim, supra note 3, at 147-50.
170. See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43, at 9-10; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at
1180-81.
171. See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43, at 10.
172. See Kim, supra note 3, at 147-50.
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Finally, the tolerance justification is the least applicable to protecting social media-algorithmic speech from regulation. The tolerance justification for free speech is that free speech exposes people
to many ideas with which they disagree, increasing tolerance, which
is an integral value.173 But social media-algorithmic speech does
precisely the opposite of what the tolerance justification envisions.174
This form of speech prevents people from interacting with an array
of ideas by creating filter bubbles that act as echo chambers.175 In
fact, this speech actually makes people less tolerant precisely by
funneling people into filter bubbles of increasingly polarized
content.176
Because even the most dangerous social media-algorithmic
speech is likely unable to meet the Brandenburg standard177 and
because free speech theoretical justifications do not support
protecting this form of speech so robustly,178 the Brandenburg
standard is unjustifiably protective of this kind of speech. The
question then becomes: is there anything that can be done to
address this problem, or is the law unwaveringly wedded to the
Brandenburg standard in every scenario? Supreme Court dicta
provide an answer. The Court has acknowledged that different
mediums present unique First Amendment issues179 and that old
doctrines cannot always be imported to the digital world.180 As such,
this Note argues that the law can and should evolve from the

173. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 1184.
174. As previously discussed, social media-algorithmic speech creates filter bubbles in
which people are not exposed to a variety of views and ideas and instead only see one side of
a given idea or issue. See supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
175. See Robichaud, supra note 12; NPR Staff, supra note 13; supra notes 119-22, 127-37
and accompanying text.
176. See Wu, supra note 127; Dick Lilly, Opinion, Social Media’s Algorithms Lead Us Down
Dark, Divisive Rabbit Holes, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 28, 2018, 9:47 AM), https://www.seattle
times.com/opinion/social-medias-algorithms-lead-us-down-dark-divisive-rabbit-holes/ [https://
perma.cc/28QJ-D9EW].
177. See supra Part II.B.1.
178. See supra Part II.B.2.
179. See F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“We have
long recognized that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems.”
(citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1952))).
180. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) (barring warrantless searches of cell
phone data).
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Brandenburg standard when assessing incitement with respect to
social media-algorithmic speech.
III. THE SOLUTION
Social media-algorithmic speech presents a uniquely high risk of
actual violent, lawless outcomes.181 However, currently, despite
social media-algorithmic speech’s high incitement risks, the Court
would most likely use the Brandenburg standard to evaluate potential social media-algorithmic incitement.182 This incredibly speechprotective standard183 affords social media-algorithmic speech more
protection than theoretical free speech justifications warrant.184 To
address the incitement problems inherent in social media-algorithmic speech, the Court can185 and should break from the Brandenburg standard when assessing potentially inciting social media-algorithmic speech. The Court should craft a new incitement standard
for social media-algorithmic speech that is less exacting by altering
Brandenburg’s intent and imminence elements.
A. A New Incitement Standard for Social Media-Algorithmic
Speech
Social media-algorithmic speech is uniquely likely to produce
lawless action.186 However, the Brandenburg standard for incitement cannot address the problem of social media-algorithmic incitement because internet speech is incredibly unlikely to meet
the standard’s stringent requirements.187 The theoretical justifications underpinning Supreme Court free speech jurisprudence
simply cannot justify protecting social media-algorithmic speech
181. See supra Part II.A.
182. See Benjamin, supra note 35, at 1446 (arguing that algorithm-based decisions, like
those of social media algorithms, are speech that the First Amendment protects); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (announcing the current standard for assessing whether speech qualifies as unprotected incitement).
183. Compare Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444-49, with Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
359-60, 372 (1927).
184. See supra Part II.B.2.
185. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
186. See supra Part II.A.
187. See supra Part II.B.1.
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so robustly.188 Therefore, to assess social media-algorithmic incitement, the Court should craft a less stringent sliding-scale standard, one that balances likelihood against intent and imminence
such that when lawless action is extremely likely, intent can be
reckless and lawless action does not have to be as imminent as
Brandenburg requires.
At present, the Brandenburg standard’s intent element seems to
require more than recklessness as to the potential for lawless
action.189 Instead, for social media-algorithmic speech, the Court
should require a lower standard of intent. The Court should allow
recklessness to suffice because lawless action is so likely to occur190
and the resulting lawless action is often incredibly severe.191
Furthermore, the Court previously allowed a decision to stand that
held a company liable for a less clearly directed intent.192 The lower
court held the company liable in part precisely because the risks
and likelihood of lawless action were so high.193
Similarly, social media-algorithmic speech is unlikely to meet the
Brandenburg standard’s imminence requirement.194 Because it
matters not just when the algorithm spoke but also when the user
received that speech, it is highly unlikely that social media-algorithmic speech could be found to incite lawless action imminently.195
188. See supra Part II.B.2.
189. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam).
190. See supra Part II.A.
191. See Temple, supra note 23 (attacks on refugees increased a full 50 percent in towns
where Facebook use increased); Blake et al., supra note 23, at 315 (showing that more
misogynistic tweets in a geographic area corresponded with increased rates of violence against
women in that area); Frenkel, supra note 28 (discussing how the violence of the Capitol
insurrection began on mainstream social media sites); Reich et al., supra note 29 (discussing
that social media-algorithmic speech on Facebook has led to extreme violent outcomes, including death); Francis Agustin, Activists and Healthcare Professionals Are Trying to Stomp Out
Anti-Vaxx Info Online—but Social Media Algorithms Are Working Against Them, BUS.
INSIDER (Oct. 2, 2021, 7:52 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/social-media-algorithmsunwinnable-misinformation-battle-2021-9 [https://perma.cc/X64W-2FQ9].
192. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 242-43 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1074 (1998).
193. See id. at 267 (noting “the extraordinary comprehensiveness, detail, and clarity of ...
instructions for criminal activity ... the boldness of ... palpable exhortation to murder, the
alarming power and effectiveness of its peculiar form of instruction”).
194. See supra Part II.B.1; Emerson J. Sykes, In Defense of Brandenburg: The ACLU and
Incitement Doctrine in 1919, 1969, and 2019, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 15, 33-34 (2019).
195. See Sykes, supra note 194, at 33-34.
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What kind of lag will exist between an algorithm making the
decisions it makes and a user receiving the product of those decisions is simply uncertain. This becomes especially uncertain
because this Note does not propose that the algorithm should be
held liable for single pieces of content. A social media algorithm
speaks by making decisions that create filter bubbles, which are
the byproduct of algorithms pushing multitudinous pieces of content.196 These bubbles make messages of their own, and it is this
accumulation that ultimately sends the inciting message for which
social media companies should be liable. Attempting to use imminence to measure such a thing is basically impossible. Because
social media-algorithmic speech is uniquely tied to violence197 and
is so unlikely to satisfy the imminence requirement,198 the Court
should do away with or at least severely scale back the imminence
requirement when assessing potential social media-algorithmic
incitement.
After altering these prongs, the Court should use the doctrine of
respondeat superior to hold social media companies liable for incitement that their algorithms cause. Under this doctrine, employers are liable for their employees’ wrongful acts.199 At least one
scholar has argued that companies should be liable for their algorithms under the doctrine of respondeat superior, saying that “[i]f
a corporation employs an algorithm that causes criminal or civil
harm, the corporation should be liable just as if the algorithm were
a human employee.”200 Social media algorithms are essentially
equivalent to social media company employees because the algorithms work in the service of the employer and the employer has

196. See NPR Staff, supra note 13.
197. See supra Part II.A; Andrew Marantz, Opinion, Free Speech is Killing Us: Noxious
Language Online Is Causing Real-World Violence. What Can We Do About It?, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/opinion/sunday/free-speech-social-mediaviolence.html [https://perma.cc/Q5KS-LJ4C].
198. See Sykes, supra note 194, at 33-34.
199. See Respondeat Superior, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). This includes
employees’ wrongful criminal acts. See Robert Luskin, Caring About Corporate “Due Care”:
Why Criminal Respondeat Superior Liability Outreaches Its Justification, 57 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 303, 303 (2020).
200. Mihailis E. Diamantis, Employed Algorithms: A Labor Model of Corporate Liability
for AI, 72 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2023) (manuscript at 1-2).
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the right to control the details of how the algorithm works.201
Algorithms make inciting speech in the scope of their employment.202
Thus, the solution to the problem of social media-algorithmic
incitement is this: when lawless action is extremely likely, courts
should hold social media companies liable under the theory of respondeat superior for their algorithms’ speech such that the intent
requirement is more relaxed and the imminence requirement is
practically eliminated.
B. Counterarguments Regarding Social Media-Algorithmic
Speech, Provision of Information, and § 230
It is worthwhile to address why this solution is possible despite
certain counterarguments. Specifically, some may argue that social
media-algorithmic speech is protected provision of information.203
Others may argue that this kind of regulation of social mediaalgorithmic speech runs afoul of 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), which dictates that social media companies cannot be held liable for users’
speech.204 However, these arguments are substantially flawed such
that they do not undermine this Note’s proposal.
1. Social Media-Algorithmic Speech Is More Than Provision of
Information
Some argue that communicating information that facilitates
criminal acts but does not advocate lawlessness fails the Brandenburg standard.205 These people may also argue that social
201. See Employee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Diamantis, supra note 200,
at 7.
202. See Scope of Employment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Diamantis, supra
note 200, at 1-2.
203. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444-49 (1969) (per curiam) (exemplifying
that under the Court’s current incitement standard, simply providing information might not
qualify as unprotected incitement because it might fail the intent and imminence elements
of the Brandenburg standard); SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43, at 52-53.
204. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); Will Oremus, Lawmakers’ Latest Idea to Fix Facebook: Regulate the Algorithm, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2021/10/12/congress-regulate-facebook-algorithm/ [https://perma.cc/HM5V-283X].
205. See, e.g., SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43, at 52-53.
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media-algorithmic speech essentially communicates information
that facilitates criminal acts but does not advocate lawlessness.
True, social media-algorithmic decisions placing content in users’
feeds do not come with explicit statements advocating crimefacilitating messages. However, sending such crime-facilitating
information so overwhelmingly206 does send a kind of message of
support.207
Furthermore, not all scholars agree that crime-facilitating
communication of information should be protected speech,208 and the
Supreme Court has never weighed in definitively on either side.209
In some instances, lower courts have held that providing crimefacilitating information qualifies as unprotected incitement even
under Brandenburg.210 In one such instance, the Supreme Court
explicitly refused to review the lower court’s ruling.211 In this vacuum, Professor Eugene Volokh has proposed a rule for handling
crime-facilitating speech:
[C]rime-facilitating speech ought to be constitutionally protected
unless (1) it’s said to a person or a small group of people when
the speaker knows these few listeners are likely to use the
information for criminal purposes, (2) it’s within one of the few
classes of speech that has almost no noncriminal value, or (3) it
can cause extraordinarily serious harm (on the order of a nuclear
attack or a plague) even when it’s also valuable for lawful
purposes.212

Social media-algorithmic speech might meet Professor Volokh’s
rule. This kind of speech could satisfy the first scenario because it

206. See supra Part II.A (discussing how social media-algorithmic speech inundates users
by creating filter bubbles that act as echo chambers and by persisting across platforms such
that this inundation is inescapable).
207. See Hassan & Barber, supra note 25 (describing how being inundated with information can lead people to lend it more credence); Temple, supra note 23 (showing that within
filter bubbles, people come to believe that violence is more supported than it actually is).
208. See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1106 (2005).
209. See id. at 1103.
210. See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 242-43 (1997), cert. denied, 523
U.S. 1074 (1998).
211. See generally id.
212. See Volokh, supra note 208, at 1106 (emphasis omitted).
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curates for and is directed to specific, individual users213 and,
therefore, is actually “said” to a single person even though algorithms operate across entire platforms for all users.214 Moreover, the
algorithmic speaker knows that the user is likely to use social
media-algorithmic speech for criminal purposes.215 Social mediaalgorithmic speech might also satisfy Professor Volokh’s third
scenario. This type of speech contributed to the January 6, 2021,
insurrection,216 which is arguably an “extraordinarily serious harm”
that is “on the order of a nuclear attack or a plague.”217 Furthermore, social media-algorithmic speech has contributed to the spread
of COVID-19,218 which is precisely “on the order of ... a plague.”219
Moreover, this counterargument somewhat misses the mark of
this Note’s argument. The argument that social media-algorithmic
speech that communicates crime-facilitating information but does
not advocate lawless action does not amount to incitement operates
under the presumption of applying the Brandenburg standard.220
Professor Volokh’s argument similarly presumes application of the
Brandenburg standard.221 But this Note argues for a break from the
Brandenburg standard when assessing social media-algorithmic
speech’s potential incitement. Frankly, this Note’s proposed altered,
less stringent standard is all the more supported precisely because
social media-algorithmic incitement is so dangerous that it can
satisfy rules that presume application of the Brandenburg
standard.222

213. See generally Kim, supra note 3.
214. See generally id.
215. See Reich et al., supra note 29 (writing that certain social media companies know that
algorithmic speech “has led to violence and death”). The companies’ knowledge is the algorithms’ knowledge because companies create and manage algorithms. See generally Kim,
supra note 3; Diamantis, supra note 200.
216. See Frenkel, supra note 28; Reich et al., supra note 29; Mac & Frenkel, supra note 128.
217. Volokh, supra note 208, at 1106 (emphasis omitted).
218. See Agustin, supra note 191.
219. See Volokh, supra note 208, at 1106.
220. See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 43, at 52-53.
221. See Volokh, supra note 208, at 1103-06.
222. See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
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2. Regulating Social Media-Algorithmic Speech Would Not Run
Afoul of § 230
Others may argue that this proposed solution to the problem
of social media-algorithmic incitement runs afoul of 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(1 ).223 Under § 230, social media companies cannot be held
liable for their users’ speech.224 As such, social media companies
are not liable when content that users have posted to companies’
sites causes lawless activity.225 At first blush, this counterargument seems formidable. But this counterargument misses the
mark. This Note does not argue that social media companies should
be held liable for users’ speech. Instead, this Note argues that social
media companies should be held liable for their own speech as made
through their algorithms.226 Social media-algorithmic decisions
amount to speech of their own apart from the content about which
they make decisions.227 This social media-algorithmic speech has a
message of its own, distinct from the message of any underlying
individual piece of content: the message of the filter bubble’s echo
chamber. An individual piece of content written by a user might say
“I hate lawyers.” A social media algorithm sending countless similar
pieces of increasingly radicalized content from a vast array of users
sends a message of its own—for example: “lawyers are fundamentally bad, and we should get rid of them by using violence.”
Some have argued that other, seemingly similar proposals that
attempt to leave § 230 in place nonetheless run afoul of § 230.228
Some lawmakers have proposed legislation that would prohibit
algorithms from discriminating “on the basis of race, age, gender
and other protected classes.”229 Certain scholars have critiqued this
idea of regulating the types of speech that social media algorithms
223. See Oremus, supra note 204.
224. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
225. See id.; Oremus, supra note 204; Daisuke Wakabayashi, Legal Shield for Social Media
Is Targeted by Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/
business/section-230-internet-speech.html [https://perma.cc/RNE7-SJV3].
226. See Benjamin, supra note 35, at 1446. This idea draws on the concept of respondeat
superior, under which employers (social media companies) are liable for their employees’ (algorithms) wrongful acts. See Respondeat Superior, supra note 199; Diamantis, supra note 200.
227. See Benjamin, supra note 35, at 1446.
228. See Oremus, supra note 204.
229. Id.
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can amplify, arguing that such proposals likely run afoul of § 230
and the First Amendment.230 Yet those proposals are fundamentally distinct from this Note’s proposed solution. Those proposed
regulations depend on prohibiting algorithms from amplifying
certain categories of underlying messages by users.231 This Note
does not propose altogether disallowing algorithmic amplification of
certain categories of messages. Instead, this Note proposes that
when social media algorithms go too far and express an overarching
inciting idea so frequently and inescapably with their speech that
they incite lawless action, social media companies should be held
liable for incitement under a less exacting standard than Brandenburg.
CONCLUSION
Social media algorithms make lawless action a particularly
likely outcome.232 Lawless action is especially likely with social
media-algorithmic speech precisely because of how social media
algorithms operate.233 However, under the current Brandenburg
standard for assessing whether speech qualifies as unprotected
incitement, social media-algorithmic speech (and internet speech in
general, for that matter) is highly unlikely to meet the necessary
requirements to qualify as inciting.234 Instead, Brandenburg robustly protects social media-algorithmic speech.235 But the theories
that undergird First Amendment protection simply do not justify
protecting social media-algorithmic speech so robustly.236
As such, instead, when social media algorithms go too far and express an overarching inciting idea so frequently and inescapably
that their speech becomes inciting, the Court should hold social
media companies liable for incitement under a less stringent standard than Brandenburg through the theory of respondeat superior.
This less stringent standard should operate such that when lawless
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

See id.
See id.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.1; Sykes, supra note 194, at 31-34.
See supra Part II.B.1; Sykes, supra note 194, at 31-34.
See supra Part II.B.2.
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action is extremely likely, the intent requirement can be downgraded and lawless action need not be imminent. This solution
would take steps to remedy the problematic relationship between
social media-algorithmic speech and violent lawless outcomes.
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